Bribery in the bureaucracy: Evidence from a list experiment among civil servants in Nepal

Abstract

Empirical studies on bureaucratic corruption typically rely on perception indices or supply-side reports from citizens and firms, leaving the behavior of public officials underexplored. Because bribery is illicit and socially stigmatized, directly measuring its prevalence is complicated by severe social desirability bias. To overcome this measurement challenge, this study applies a list experiment to a sample of 1,634 civil servants across central government institutions in Nepal to provide rare, micro-level evidence on the demand side of bribery. The results indicate that informal payments are prevalent, with approximately 26.4 percent of respondents estimated to have received bribes while delivering public services. Furthermore, multivariate analysis reveals that bureaucratic hierarchy is the primary driver of corruption risk. High-ranking officials with greater administrative authority are significantly more likely to engage in bribery, whereas gender and occupational specialization exhibit no systematic association with corrupt behavior once position is controlled for. These findings suggest that corruption is shaped more by institutional architecture and discretionary power than by individual demographic traits, underscoring the need for anti-corruption reforms that target concentrated administrative authority.